Intelligence is intormation that has been subject to a defined evalation and risk assessment process (3x5x2) in order to assist with police decision making. - It is also formulaically denhedas Information + Analysis = Intelligence.

Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded, or processed by the police, including personal data and intelligence. Intelligence is defined as information that has been subject to a ‘defined evaluation and risk assessment process (3x5x2) in order to assist with police decision making.

- Police and community collaborating/interacting. - Officers are accountable in needing to know their area. - Allows community to have a say in policing priorities. - Enhances decision making at lower levels (bottom up). - Builds police legitimacy in eyes of public. - Community safety takes priority.

- Community satisfaction - Police legitimacy and confidence in police is central aim. - Focus on community priorities. - It is ‘bottom up’. - Local police are responsible.

- Community policing is so ‘broad that police officers are inundated with requests that go beyond the scope of traditional law enforcement. - About community reassurance rather than fighting crime. - It’s ‘target’ outcome is unclear. - Limited effect on crime, or fear of crime.

- Hollistic ‘problem solving’. - Long term fix (not short term). - Not just detecting crime and making arrests, but addressing root problems. - Uses SARA model.

- Scanning: identifying recurring problems + impact on community. - Analysis: Collecting + analysing data e.g. time of occurrence, location, and how to alter causes. - Response: What responses work elsewhere; pick a range of local options then pick best. - Assessment: Did the response reduce the problem; if no identify other strategies that may work.

- Officers and analysts to ID and solve the problem. - Seeks long term solution. - Looks at not just criminal law/sanctions as a resolution. - Success of intervention is evaluated. - Links in well with situational crime. - Solutions grounded in evidence base (what works?).

- Officers defer to management to resolve the problems. - Officers cannot control whether these issues get resourced and cannot operationalise their solutions. - It requires a culture change: officers are prone to be prosecution oriented.

- Involves face to face performance meetings to compare statistics, addresses crime trends, patterns, hotspot mapping. - Holds middle managers to account for delivering crime reduction strategies. - One of key reforms introduced to NYPD on zero tolerance policing in 1990s. - It’s about blending data crunching (crime mapping) with operational strategy.

- Encourages internal accountability and development of local problem solving. - Meetings focused on problem solving (rather than blame) had greater innovation and stronger crime control gains. - Good evidence in targeting recidivist offenders in Australia.

- Introduced alongside other strategies e.g. (hotspot policing) - difficult to assess effectiveness. - Meetings ‘held people to account’ rather than problem solved. - Pressure could encourage manipulation of crime figures. - Reinforces traditional ‘command and control’ hierarchical approach. - Commanders apply traditional and reactive methods e.g. directed patrol + offender arrests. - Few commanders are trained to interpret mapping.

- Use of historical data to forecast future criminality and therefore make decisions about having officers at a time and place to defer criminal activity.

- Intelligence-led policing emphasises analysis and intelligence as pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that prioritises crime hot spots, repeat victims, prolific offenders and criminal groups. - It facilitates crime and harm reduction, disruption, and prevention through strategies, and tactical management, deployment and enforcement.

- A 1993 Audit Commision Report concluded: A need to target criminals (not the crime) and focus on ‘forensic and intelligence based’ evidence. Rely on informants, and undercover surveillance.

- Business model for policing, not a process for ‘managing intelligence’. - Several central themes: 1. Targets prolific + serious criminals proactively. 2. Screens out most crime from further investigation. 3. Makes greater strategic use of surveillance + informants; cultivates informants and tasks them to produce info on high priority crimes and criminals. 4. Positions intelligence to central decision making should at the hub of operational policing. - Many modern approaches to risk - looks at chronic high risks, rather than individual offence detection. - Places analysis at the centre of decision making, including solving ‘traffic, patrol and partnership activities’. - Not just linked to gathering intel from informants or surveillance. - Necessity to be more ‘efficient and effective’. - Crime analysis of crime patterns (places), hotspot data, and intelligence about offenders. Blend of knowledge about offenders and about crime events. - Places emphasis on information sharing and collaboration and strategic solutions to crime problems. - Antithesis of community policing. - Like compstat, hierarchical and top down. - Intelligence officers and analysts guide operations rather than the other way around. - Intelligence led policing that is the philosophy underpinning the police national intelligence model (NIM).

- 2004, rolled out across 43 forces in England and Wales.

- Frustration of central government and senior police ranks. - Traditional reactive methods not effective (not proactive). - Why were police failing to reduce crime? (anti logical crisis). - Volume crime committed by a few prolific offenders (let’s target them). - Let’s more effectively target using technology (surveillance equipment).

- Business model that prioritises use of resources, coordinating action for targeting serial perpetrators, organised crime groups (OCGs), and crime hotspots. - Not just about ‘intelligence processes’, some think it has been wrongly named and should be the national policing model. - Standardising processes, structures, and practices across police service. - Promoting ILP. - Problem solving approach.

- Improves flow of info from the small micro level of a division to macro level of a nation (divisions/forces/region/nation). - Level 1 is concerned with local area (basic command unit (BCU) (division or one force). - Level 2 is force and cross-regional issues. - Level 3 is national and international threats (serious and organised crime).

- Officers are responsible for recording and disseminating info which must have a policing purpose. 1. Protecting life and purpose. 2. Preserving order. 3. Preventing the commision of offences. 4. Bringing offenders to justice. 5. Any duty or responsibility of the police arising from common or statute law. - These provide a legal basis for collecting, recording, evaluating, sharing, and retaining.

- Police/PCSO responding to incidents. - Arrests made. - Stop and search/ stop and account. - Patrol work.

- You have been tasked with doing something around a suspect, victim or area as part of an “intelligence requirement”. - Could be CHIS, ANPR, CCTV systems or other internal/external databases.

- Not from routine or tasked. - Examples, crimestopper tip-off, anti-terrorism hotline, neighbourhood watch info, an incident where info put on system (and officer didn’t attended), and info from partner agencies e.g. social services referral about a child protection matter.

- Source is believed to be competent. - Info generally reliable. - Scientific/forensic: DNA/fingerprints. - Can include human intelligence, technical (CCTV/ANPR).

- If either reliable/untested are not met the answer should be not reliable. - If you have a reason to doubt specify it in the report.

- Source has not given info to person receiving it before. May not be unreliable but should be treated with caution. - Before acting on info, seek corroboration. - Examples, members of public, crime-stoppers, and neighbours.

- Known directly to the source. - First hand info. - Witnessing event.

- Known directly but corroborates - Source has not witnessed. - Must be corroborated. - Corroboration can come from technical or other intel sources, investigations, or enquiries. - Has to be corroboration and not info from same source.

- Known indirectly to the source. - Source does not witness or have first hand knowledge. - Someone else told them (second hand/third party info).

- Not known. - No way of addressing info. - Could be info from an anonymous source/ crime-stopper.

- Suspected to be false/ - Treat with extreme caution. - Regardless of how source came upon info, there is reason to believe the info provided is false. - Rationale behind why you think it’s false must be in intelligence report.

- Police must use info for a policing purpose and manage lawfully. - Review retention, and disposal scheme about offenders, suspected offenders, or ‘another’ policing purpose.

- Crime/Offence: Retain and review info to protect public and manage risks posed by known offenders/other potentially dangerous individuals and ensures compliance with relevant legislation. - Other policing purposes: missing people, lost/found property, licensing records, event notifications, RTCs (where there is no suspecting behaviour).

- Accurate - Adequate - Up to date. - Kept no longer than necessary.

- Evidence of a capacity to inflict serious harm. - Concerns kids/vulnerable adults. - Involves breach of trust? - Is there evidence of established links or associations which might increase risk of harm? (OCGs). - Concerns of substance misuse? - Concerns of mental state? - Other issues that impact on the level/ of the risk the person presents. - Is individual of interest to ongoing public enquiries?

- Infringement of rights to privacy. - Are records accurate, relevant, up to date, and for a policing purpose? - Are risks still current?

- As minimum: forname, surname, partial name, nickname, alias. - No name = no record creation. - Desirable fields: Age, DOB, Sex, Race/ethnicity, height.

1. Inital Review. 2. Scheduled Review. 3. Triggered Review.

1. Nominal is a higher risk than previously recorded - alters retention period. 2. Old record is found to be inaccurate/out of date. 3. Nominal has died.

- Workflow tool for analysts. - Planning: what is intell requirement or intell gap? - Collection: open sources, classified, human assets (CHIS), technical, docs? - Processing: sifting noisy data, removing outliers or missing values. - Analysis + production: evaluates, makes sense, interpret, inferences drawn. - Disseminate: Do we still have a gap? Disseminate + protect source.

- Anacapa chart: network diagram, pictorial aid, simplifies a mass of data. - For example, who is related to who, who is central, who is peripheral? Simple communication of results.

- Temporal analysis, referring to time. Who did what, when? - Events chronologically ordered, following a time sequence. - Useful for cold case investigations.

- May be based on home office priorities (level 3). - Force strategic assessments by force tend to be produced yearly (level 2). - Helps basic command units focus on divisional priorities (level 1).

- Draws immediate attention to immediate issues that need resourcing. - Combine discussion of old priorities and newly arising problems on that division or in that force. - These documents typically contain crime mapping, charts, hotspot data, defining victims, how offences occur, where issue impacts.

- TCG owner of business at divisional level. - Chair typically superintendent. - Intelligence hub inspector involved. - Decision making should be informed by intelligence + analytical products. - Idea of TCG is to implement control strategy and their tactical assessment document. - Meetings held fortnightly, monthly, or daily. - Little difference in crime reduction when first introduced.

- Increased use of intelligence logs across division. - Involved partner agencies in sharing info/intelligence. - Target criminals arrested as result of a TTCG. - Change of tactics, plans, and resources due to new intel picture (evidence).

- Senior leaders didn’t routinely chair meetings. - Like a competition with staff ‘bidding’ for resources. - Not read tactical assessment. - Lower ranks do not have capability to direct resources. - No attention paid to analytical evidence. - Too much looking back meant short term problem solving. - Lack of training on NIM. - Preoccupation with performance targets not intelligence findings. - Retention of analysts.

Any person who: a) Establishes or maintains a personal or other relationship with another person for the covert purpose of facilitating the doing of anything falling within paragraph (b) or (c). b) Covertly uses such a relationship to obtain information or to provide access to any info or another person. c) Covertly discloses information obtained by the use of such a relationship or as a consequence of the existence of such a relationship.

- Audit commision 1993 supported their use to target persistent offenders. - Provides low cost, relevant, and accurate info. - Prevents need for expensive and lengthy police activity (surveillance). - Helped ID and disrupt terrorist plots.

- Often criminals themselves. - Revenge motive against person they are ‘grassing’ on. - Seeking out info rather than providing police with intelligence - Intend to disrupt investigation by providing false info. - Deception. - Informants are sneaky, have malicious intent, and unpredictable. - Should only be managed by experienced officers.

- Disclosure of intelligence material looks at (PII). - Public interest in not making disclosure (of the CHIS details) outweighs the interests of the accused (full disclosure). - Can involve redacted docs; summaries of sensitive intelligence, or abandoning the case. - Has chequered past before the European Court of Human Rights.

- Enhanced authority and safeguards expected when children are CHIS. - Children already involved in crime — not exploiting. - Sometimes using juvenile CHIS is the only way e.g. drug dealing in schools. - In 2015-2018 only 14 juvenile CHIS compared to 3000 adult CHIS.

- Lasted 1 month but under RIPA Juvenile Amendment Order 2018, lasts 4. - ACC must authorise (higher authority). - Risk Assessment needed before authorised. - CHIS can’t inform on parent/ or someone with parental responsibility over them. - Appropriate adult must be present at all meetings between police and juvenile CHIS.

It governs the use of covert surveillance by public bodies.

- Police. - Other law enforcement (Serious Fraud Office, National Crime Agency). - Security and intelligence services (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ). - Local Government.

- Monitoring, observing, or listening to persons, their movements, their conversations or their other activities or communications. - Recording anything monitored, observed, or listened to in the course of the surveillance. - Surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.

- If surveillance is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that the persons who are subject of the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place can it be defined as covert.

- Covert and is undertaken: for the purpose of a specific investigation or operation, likely to result in obtaining private information about a person, whether or not that person is specifically identified for the purpose of the operation, and the surveillance. - It is otherwise than by way of an immediate response, to events or circumstances.

- Example: Surveillance officers intend to follow and observe Jo Smith covertly as part of a pre-planned operation to determine her suspected involvement in a series of city centre robberies. Covert surveillance is undertaken and officers are recording her activities as part of the investigation. (Likely to obtain private information). Covert surveillance is pre-planned and not part of general observational duties or reactive policing. A directed surveillance authorisation should therefore be considered. - Drones (unmanned aircraft) - demonstration being monitored: Directed Surveillance - Vehicle tracking ‘lump’

- A written authorisation may be given by a superintendent for 3 months (6 month if intelligence services). - An urgent oral authorisation may be given by a superintendent for 72 hours. - An urgent written authorisation may be given by an inspector (if no superintendent available) for 72 hours.

- Necessity: no other way of addressing the aim in question. - Proportionality: the activity proposed is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. - Least intrusive methods: not defined in RIPA or HRA. - Collateral Intrusion: authorising officer has to consider other people who are not necessarily the intended targets (is this proportionate?).

- CCTV does not require surveillance authority. - CCTV and ANPR are overt cameras (aware they are there) so no authorities needed. - In response to immediate events - not practicable to obtain directed surveillance authority. - If surveillance is in public place and not focused on any specific subjects - directed surveillance not required. - Howerver if they are used to follow an individual already identified then a directed surveillance authority is required.

- Covert - Carried out in relation to anything taking place on residential premises, or in any private vehicle, and involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the vehicle, or is carried out by a means of a surveillance device.

- A written authorisation may be given by a secretary of state for 3 months ( 6 months if in intelligence services). - In an urgent case, written authority can be given by Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) - In urgent cases oral or written authority only lasts 72 hours. - For renewals Judicial Commissioner approval needed.

- Intrusive surveillance is usually linked to a property interference authorisation (to install a device). This is generally on private property or interference with private property without consent. - Planting a listening device (bug) in someone’s house is ‘intrusive’ surveillance. - Also the mechanical installation of an eavesdropping device with microphone in a car. - A vehicle tracking device (lump) also amounts to property interference (but doesn’t any other authority.

- About a communication rather than its contents: Phone number, phone provider, create itemised billing (who the phone phoned), time and duration of calls, identify sender or recipient, subscribe checks (name and address of phone owner), and billing methods.

- Most sensitive part of phone call/text msg/fax (what was said in conversation). -Intercept requires a telecommunications operator. -Authorised under warrant by the home secretary.

-Systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually. to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence and to publicise a cause, as well as to coerce a target to accede to the terrorsts aims.

- Remove the risk. - Avoid the risk. - Reduce the risk. - Accept the risk.

- 52 people killed. - Several hundred injured 7 july 2005. - Circle line, piccadilly line, and top of double decker bus. - All perpetrators from West Yorkshire, born and raised in UK. All pakistani heritage other than Lindsay who was West Indian born in Jamaica and a convert to islam. - Explosions, home-made organic peroxide-based devices, packed in rucksacks. - Khan and Tanweer monitored on at least 4 occasions, seen as peripheral figures by SIS, they had operational training in Pakistan Nov 2004 to Feb 2005.

- He was brutally attacked and killed in Artillery Place, Woolwich. - Adebolajo and Adebowale crashed into him using a car, then used a machete to cut at his neck. - Intended a martyrs death: wanting to be shot at when police arrived. - Adebowale seen as low priority. On periphery. - Application for intrusive techniques against adebowale - sent the day before the murder.

- 2017 bombing killed 22 people and injured hundreds. - Much criticism about the lack of coordination between police and other emergency services - ‘didn’t work at all’. - Reports by public about Abedi fell on deaf ears. - Parents sought asylum in UK in 1993 facing persecution from Gaddafi. - Wider Abedi family hold significant responsibility for radicalisation of Salman Abedi and brother Hashem Abedi (convicted 2020 for supporting).

- Should not act as an ‘agent provocateur’. - Intimate and sexual relationship ‘never acceptable’ when deployed to infiltrate.

- Financial data. - CCTV. - ANPR. - Telecommunications data (phone calls to/from and when and to whom). - Suspicious activity reports (SARS) elmer database. - List of passenger data (terrorism). - Gas and electricity companies.

- Can pinpoint a vehicles movements at a particular time,date and location, possibly implicating the driver in particular criminality. - The cameras are static, also some mobile units. They read car reg numbers every 4 seconds. These images are stored. - It can track suspect vehicle and suspect. - It can track vehicles in convoys; or witnesses in the line of traffic. - It can research victim vehicle. - It can research an alibi. - Assists with future surveillance operation (proactive).